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Under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) tariffs on U.S. potato imports to
Mexico were phased out by 1993. Citing phytosanitary issues, in 1996, the Mexican gov-
ernment placed quantitative restrictions on U.S. potato imports and restricted their import
only to designated border areas. This article estimates the welfare cost of restricting U.S.
potato imports into Mexico. We find that removing trade restrictions may lead to over 1.8
million tons of new imports into Mexico, a gain of consumer surplus of 4.0 billion pesos per
year, and a loss of 2.9 billion pesos of producer surplus.
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Potato consumption in Mexico grew from 1.08
million metric tons (MT) in 1994 to over 1.77
million MTin 2004, an increase of some 65.0%
in a decade (Food and Agricultural Organiza-
tion, 2008). Over the same period, however,
imports have grown more quickly, from 165.8
thousand MT to 421.9 thousand MT (154.0%).
Although the rise in imports is notable, it is
perhaps more surprising that import volumes
have not risen further yet, given the relatively
high price of potatoes in Mexico. Despite the
implementation of NAFTA, which abolished
all tariffs and tariff-quotas on potatoes by 2003,
trade in fresh potatoes between the United
States and Mexico continues to be restricted by
phytosanitary regulations. Mexican trade offi-
cials argue that U.S. potatoes are infested with
pests and diseases that are not present in
Mexico, so U.S. potato imports are limited to
a 26 km exclusion zone adjacent to the U.S.
border. This research investigates the welfare
effects of restricting trade in U.S. potatoes from
a Mexican consumer perspective.
In the Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS
Agreement) reached as part of the Uruguay
Round of the World Trade Organization in
1995, member nations agree to be bound by a
set of protocols governing the use, and abuse,
of SPS regulations on traded agricultural prod-
ucts (Roberts and Krissoff, 2004). One of these
protocols allows for the use of a limited set of
regulations that are designed to reduce the
likelihood of a food, plant, or animal health
incident. Although not a violation of the letter
of the SPS agreement, U.S. potato growers and
trade officials are concerned that Mexican SPS
regulations are being used as a tool of com-
mercial policy, rather than legitimate means of
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From an economist perspective, efficient trade
policy requires regulators to restrict trade in the
name of SPS only to the extent that the value of
protecting either producers or consumers is
greater than the cost of giving up lower-cost
imports (Orden and Romano, 1996).
Although most research on SPS trade re-
strictions find them to be welfare-reducing
(Calvin and Krissoff, 1998; Peterson and
Orden, 2008), the one study that specifically
addresses this issue finds the opposite (Tecno-
logico de Monterrey, 2007). Welfare-enhancing
SPS trade barriers are theoretically possible if
domestic producers increase supply in the ab-
sence of a threat from contamination. However,
these benefits must be weighed against the cost
of higher domestic prices. Ultimately, there-
fore, resolving the question is an empirical
matter. This study attempts to do so by devel-
oping an empirical model of Mexican potato
supply, demand, and economic welfare.
In the next section, we present some back-
ground and additional details on the nature of
Mexican potato imports, and the policy gov-
erning them. In the second section, we describe
a simple economic model of trade in which a
small country imposes SPS restrictions, or
technical barriers to trade (TBT), on imports
from a large country. We use this model to
derive some expected results, which are tested
in the empirical analysis that follows. The third
section describes the econometric model used
to estimate the trade and welfare effects of
relaxing the technical barriers to trade, while
the fourth provides a brief description of the
data used to estimate the model. In the fifth
section, we summarize the econometric esti-
mation and welfare simulation results and dis-
cuss the implications that follow. The final
section concludes and draws some important
caveats to our findings.
Background on Mexico Potato Import Policy
From the signing of the NAFTA agreement
until full implementation, exports of U.S. and
Canadian potato products to Mexico still faced
tariff-based restrictions. Under the tariff-rate
quota system that beganin 1993, U.S. exporters
could sell 15,000 tons into Mexico tariff-free
with a tariff of 272% applying to all amounts
above the quota level (Table 1). To gradually
movetoward completely tariff-free imports, the
quota rose to 19,000 tons per year by 2002,
with a tariff-rate of 51.6% applying to all over-
quotaamounts.Throughoutthetransitionperiod,
however, actual U.S. imports were significantly
under the quota level each year. Beginning in
2003, there were no quotas or tariffs in place as
per the NAFTA agreement, however, SPS regu-
lations established in 1996 were still in place.
In 1996 the Mexican government estab-
lished an ‘‘...external quarantine aimed to pre-
vent introduction of potato-related pests...’’
aimed at excluding potatoes that may carry a
number of possible diseases including golden
nematode, potato virus Y, potato yellow dwarf
virus, and a number of others (Senasica, 2008).
This quarantine banned all potato imports
from the major growing regions in the United
States (primarily the Pacific Northwest) and
limited imports from other states to a 26 km
zone along the United States/Mexico border.1
Although the zone includes many large Mexi-
can cities and some 6.5 million residents, it
nonetheless effectively prevents most Mexican
consumers from buying potatoes imported
from the United States. Mexican agricultural
authorities maintain thatthese pestsdonotexist
in Mexican production regions, and if they
were to become established, control costs
would rise and impose significant economic
damage on domestic potato producers. U.S.
authorities from United States Department of
Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Protec-
tion Service have continually challenged the
scientific basis of the quarantine, arguing that
the pests claimed in the regulation were already
present in Mexico (Qaim, 1998). In 2003,
Mexican and U.S. agricultural officials signed
an agreement inwhichMexico agreed topermit
imports from any U.S. state into Mexico and to
1In the context of the Mexican trade policy, ‘‘quar-
antine’’ refers to a policy of excluding all imports
deemed to be at risk for contamination to an agricul-
tural zone in which potatoes are not produced. Note
that this usage differs from the typical use of the term
quarantine.
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Although potatoes can move from any state
into Mexico, the 26 km zone regulation has not
been removed.
The market for fresh potatoes in Mexico is
potentially lucrative for U.S. growers, but is
highly complex. First, the Mexican market
is better described as a number of regional
markets, each with its own unique preferences
and locally competing production. Although
residents in the southern part of Mexico tend to
consume more corn (in the form of tortillas)
and rice, potato consumption is more common
in the temperate northern states. Consumption
and local supply tend to be highly corre-
lated—22 states in Mexico grow potatoes—but
theprimary production regionslie along ornear
the Pacific Coast with 35% of total production
in Sinaloa and 26% in Sonora. Other important
producing states are Guanajuato (Central
Mexico), Veracruz in the Gulf of Mexico, and
Chihuahua in the North. Although Americans
tend to think of the typical Mexican carbohy-
drate as either rice, corn, or perhaps beans,
potato consumption forms a significant part of
the daily diet at approximately 37.4 lbs per
capita per year (Barquera et al., 2006). Do-
mestic Mexican potatoes, however, are differ-
ent from the U.S. potatoes that are exported to
Mexico. Mexican growers primarily produce
the alpha variety, which are smaller, rounder,
and have a thin skin and yellow flesh compared
with the large, white, thick-skinned U.S. im-
ports. Alpha potatoes account for 60% of total
production, whereas red potatoes make up 15%
and 25% are other varieties (Santiago-Cruz and
Salazar, 2000). Despite their dominance of the
fresh market, alpha potatoes are not particu-
larly well-suited for deep-frying, however, so
the vast majority of Mexican processed and
processing needs are imported from the United
States. Although Mexico imported 55.9 thou-
sand metric tons of fresh potatoes in 2007, it
imported over 85.3 thousand metric tons
of frozen potatoes (United States Department
of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Services,
2008). Of the total Mexican potato output in
1999, 73% went to fresh usage, 14% to potato
chips, and 13% to seed, leaving very little for
domestic frozen production (Jabalera et al.,
2000). Given that the population of Mexico
now exceeds 100 million, the market potential
for U.S. potato exporters is clear.
Observed price differences between im-
ported U.S. potatoes and domestic Mexican
potatoes suggest that, despite the partial liber-
alization in 2003, trade is still far from free.
Clearly, there is an equilibrium price differen-
tial that can only be maintained with some sort
of regulatory prevention of arbitrage. The rel-
evant question, therefore, becomes one of
finding the level of trade that would be con-
sistent with Mexican prices equaling world
market prices for potatoes.






Quota (MT) Actual Imports from
U.S. (MT) U.S. Canada
1992 2,091
1993 272.0 0.354 15,000 4,000 2,767
1994 261.1 0.339 15,450 4,120 3,565
1995 250.2 0.325 15,814 4,244 2,728
1996 239.3 0.311 16,391 4,371 881
1997 228.4 0.297 16,883 4,502 83
1998 217.6 0.283 17,389 4,637 508
1999 206.7 0.269 17,911 4,776 4,296
2000 155.0 9.201 18,448 4,920 6,485
2001 103.3 0.134 19,002 5,067 4,747
2002 51.6 0.067 0 0 2,110
Source: Tecnologico de Monterrey, 2007 and FASOnline (United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural
Services, 2008).
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Restrictions
The barriers to U.S. potato imports used by the
Mexican government constitute ‘‘regulatory
protection’’ in that they insulate Mexican po-
tato growers from U.S. competition (Josling,
1997). Regulatory protection implies that the
existing regime of geographic quarantines ef-
fectively shifts the excess supply curve back-
ward at all price levels. As Baldwin (1991)
explains, such trade barriers can be conceptu-
alized in many different ways, depending upon
their impact on exporters. Paarlberg and Lee
(1998), Petry, Paarlberg, and Lee (1999), and
Peterson, Paggi, and Henry (1988) explain
recent examples of cases involving foot-and-
mouth disease, porcine reproductive and res-
piratory syndrome, and European Union (EU)
restrictions on hormone use in imported prod-
ucts, respectively, while Sumner and Lee (1997)
describe a model of trade restrictions on the
import of rice by East Asian nations. Beyond
agriculture, Hickock (1985) applies a similar,
partial-equilibrium model to the evaluation of
U.S. trade barriers on clothing, sugar, and steel.
The Mexican potato case is somewhat unique in
that it both imposes costs on U.S. exporters in
terms of meeting inspection and handling pro-
tocols for potatoes that move into the 26 km
zone, and imposes an outright ban on movement
beyond. Consequently, the quarantine can be
thought of as increasing the cost of exporting to
the border zone, and creating a dual market
within Mexico. Because the border zone does
not fully comprise any particular state, it is not
possible to completely distinguish the demand
for U.S. and Mexican potatoes from publicly
available data as in the U.S. avocado ban ex-
ample discussed by Peterson and Orden (2008)
and Orden and Romano (1996). However,
consumers in the border zone are free to con-
sume either potatoes imported from the U.S.,
those produced locally, or brought in from
areas outside the quarantine zone. Therefore,
this intermingling of U.S. imports and domestic
product ensure that price arbitrage, subject to
inherent price differences due to differentiation
and transport costs, must exist. Any difference
between the price of U.S. imports, adjusted for
differentiation and transport, and the domestic
price of Mexican potatoes must be attributed to
the cost of the TBT.2 In effect, the quarantine
drives a wedge between the world (U.S.) price
and the domestic Mexican price and reduces
trade volumes (Beghin and Bureau, 2001;
Calvin and Krissoff, 1998; Josling, 1997). Be-
cause the quarantine constitutes a TBT that
causes observed consumer prices in Mexico to
be higher than import prices from the United
States, the ‘‘price wedge’’ model is appropriate
in this case. Similar to other price wedge studies
(Calvin and Krissoff, 1998; Yue, Beghin, and
Jensen, 2006), we assume all of the difference
between the domestic Mexican price and the
world (U.S.) price is represented by a ‘‘tariff-
equivalent’’ value, or the shadow price of con-
strained U.S. imports in the Mexican market.
Therefore, wewrite the relationship between the
two prices (assuming trade is not zero so we are
not at a corner solution) under the law of one
price as:
(1) pm 5puð11tÞ,
where pm is the domestic Mexican consumer
price, pu is the price in Mexico (in pesos, ap-
propriately converted using a real exchange
rate, after freight costs and insurance) of U.S.
(imported) potatoes, and t is the amount of a
hypothetical tariff that would achieve the same
tradevolumes as the ban placed by the Mexican
government.
Typically, price wedge studies assume the
domestic and imported products are perfect
substitutes. In the U.S./Japan apple case, how-
ever, Yue, Beghin, and Jensen (2006) argue that
agricultural practices and other factors mean
that Japanese and U.S. apples, even those of the
same variety, are perceived as significantly
different to consumers. Similarly, Mexican and
U.S. potatoes differ in both visual and eating
attributes. Although the Mexican alpha potato
is small, round, and has yellow flesh, the pri-
mary U.S. export is the Russett Burbank, which
is larger, has a rougher brown skin and white
2The Mexican policy is not equivalent to a quota
because importers within the 26 km zone are free to
import all they wish.
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ferentiated nature of U.S. exports to explain
some of the departure from the arbitrage con-
dition shown in Equation (1) above.
Most analyses of trade in differentiated
products use a variant of the constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) demand model (Peterson
and Orden, 2008, for example). However, the
CES has the undesirable characteristic that elas-
ticities are not affected by crowding the product
space. Intuitively, wewould expect that addinga
producttoacharacteristicspaceoffixedsizewill
lead to higher price elasticities, and hence lower
prices, for all. Further, in a differentiated prod-
ucts context, consumers tend to buy only one
of the range of available variants, not a small
amount of each as the CES model assumes.
Therefore, we follow Anderson, de Palma, and
Thisse (1992) (ADT) and Anderson and de
Palma (1992) and adopt a discrete choice model
of demand. To our knowledge, this is the first
application of the discrete choice approach to
the analysis of TBT. Using a discrete choice
approach has several advantages. First, the
modelyieldsrelativelyparsimonious,analytical
solutions that are readily amenable to uncover-
ingtheequilibriumvalueoftheTBT.Second,as
ADT show, the discrete choice model can be
equivalent to the more common CES approach,
but is a more logically consistent description of
consumer choice for differentiated food prod-
ucts. Third, the logit model used here does not
impose the unrealistic assumption that substitu-
tion elasticities are invariant to the number of
products in the market. Rather, as more varieties
are introduced in the discrete choice model, the
elasticity of each variant rises, and equilibrium
prices fall, as theory would lead us to expect.
Preferences for a representative consumer,
h, in a discrete choice model of demand are
expressed in terms of a random utility model in
which the indirect utility function for the con-
sumer are given as:
(2) uh





where pj is the price of choice j (j 5 o, m,a n du
for the outside, Mexican, and U.S. options, as
well as r, b,a n dc for rice, beans, and corn, re-
spectively), xj is a k   1 vector of attributes of
choice j, g is a choice-specific preference pa-
rameter, a is the (constant) marginal utility of
income, x is an error term that is unobservable to
theeconometrician(factorssuchasvariationson
potato quality, media information about either
nutritional or safety attributes of potatoes, or
other important demand-shifters that are funda-
mentally unobserved), and ej
h is an iid error term
that is assumed to be double-exponentially dis-
tributed with scale parameter, 0 < m <1 .I n
the potato context, m represents the degree of
heterogeneity between domestic and imported
potatoes so that if m 5 0, Mexican and U.S.
potatoes are regarded as perfect substitutes
by Mexican consumers, despite their obvious
observable differences. Define the mean util-
ityfromchoicejas: dj5gj   apj 1
P
k bkxjk 1











where i 5 0 reflects the choice of an outside
option, which yields utility that is normalized
to zero. Aggregating over all representative
consumers with this expression means that








To find the equilibrium value of t,h o w e v e r ,
we must also take into account the expected
response by Mexican potato suppliers to any
change in their supply price. Assuming a fully
integrated potato supply chain in Mexico, so
that retailers and growers’ interests are aligned,
potato suppliers are faced with the following
optimization problem:3
(4) pr
mðpmÞ5M½pm   cmðqmðpmÞÞ Sm,
where M is the size of the total market for po-
tatoes and potato substitutes. Assuming potato
retailers compete in prices and marginal cost is
convex in qm, and substituting the arbitrage
3Clearly, this is a simplification of the true potato
supply chain. Modeling retailers and growers sepa-
rately, however, is not necessary for the conclusions
we derive and does not affect the qualitative nature of
our solution.
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vides an expression for t that takes into account
both demand and supply response for a differ-
entiated product:
where: u is the product of the elasticity of
supply and elasticity of cost with respect to
quantity (marginal costcurve slope).4 Thevalue
of the TBT on U.S. potatoes, therefore, is a
function of the price of each type of potatoes,
preferences for each, the marginal cost of pro-
duction, and the response of domestic Mexican
suppliers.
On the supply-side, Mexican producers face
choices as well. Although other trade studies
may explicitly recognize the differentiated na-
ture of product demand (Yue, Beghin, and
Jensen, 2006), few consider the options avail-
able to suppliers in the domestic industry.
Therefore, we adopt a multiproduct supply
model that describes output allocation and
supply response in a manner consistent with the
theory of the firm. Specifically, we model the
supply of alpha-type Mexican potatoes using a
Generalized Leontief (GL) profit function ap-
proach (Diewert, 1971; Shumway and Lim,
1993) in which suppliers distribute potatoes,
corn, beans, and rice for the domestic market.
Applying Hotelling’s Lemma to the GL profit
function provides a system of output supply



















where pi is the price of netput i, qi is the
quantity supplied, and X is a vector of exoge-
nous supply factors, which we model empiri-
cally below as including annual differences in
production conditions and seasonal variation in
supply. With this specification, the elasticity of
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which, once estimated, can be used to calculate
the value of the TBT in Equation (5) above.
The difference between the aggregate supply
of domestic potatoes implied by Equation (6)
and demand implied by Equation (3) at the value
of t given by Equation (5) determines the impact
of removing the quarantine on Mexican producer
and consumer welfare. More trade, however,
does not necessarily mean that all stakeholders
in the importing country are better off. To esti-
mate the gains from trade due to removing the
SPS trade restrictions, it is necessary to calculate
the change in both consumer and producer sur-
plus. The change in consumer surplus (DCS) is
found by calculating the total amount of CS at a
price pu 1 t and subtracting the total CS without
trade restrictions (at price pu), or:
(8)




















d is the quantity demanded before re-
moving the trade regulation and q1
d is the hy-
pothetical or counterfactual quantity demanded
without the trade restriction. The potential
change in producer surplus (DPS), on the other
hand, is the difference between the price re-
ceived in the market and production cost, or:
(9)





















S are defined analogously to the
demand values above. Producer surplus is thus
(5) t5
Suð1   SuÞ 11aðpu   cuÞ ðÞ 1Smð11SmÞ 1  ð pu   ucmÞ ðÞ
aSmð1   SmÞ
4Without data on the marginal cost of producing
potatoes in Mexico, we assume the marginal cost
elasticity is 1.0, so the value of u is equal to the
supply elasticity.
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each point is estimated. Note in both of these
cases, however, that the calculations are linear
approximations to the true demand and supply
functions. To the extent that the actual curves
are nonlinear in the region of the price change
contemplated here, these estimates will imply a
small error in approximation. Given that the
change in price is relatively small, this error will
notaffectthequalitativenatureofourconclusions.
Implementing Equation (5) to find the
amount by which trade is reduced by SPS
regulations requires: (1) the estimation of eD,
(2) the estimation of eS, and (3) the calculation
of t. Although we describe how the elasticities
of supply and demand are estimated below,
determining the appropriate value of t is typi-
cally more problematic as it requires accurate
data on domestic and world (border) prices for
the imported good. The cost-insurance-freight
world price, which includes transportation and
insurance costs, is, in theory, the most appro-
priate value to compare with the domestic
price. By including all transit costs, the gap
between domestic and world price is assumed
to include only tariff and the implicit value of
nontariff barriers (NTBs). In this sense, once
explicit tariffs are taken into account, the value
of all NTBs becomes a residual that is imputed
from observed price data. The implicit value of
the NTB, or its tariff-rate equivalent, is the
value of the implicit tariff that would restrict
trade to the level implied by the NTB.
Econometric Model of Trade Restrictions
In order to parameterize the welfare model
described above, we estimate two econometric
models: (1) Mexican potato demand, and (2)
potato supply. The demand model reflects the
fundamental difference between imported po-
tatoes, those produced domestically in the U.S.,
and all other substitute options while the supply
model reflects the alternative product oppor-
tunities available to Mexican growers.
Mexican potato demand is modeled using
the representative consumer, discrete choice ap-
proach (Anderson and de Palma, 1992; Ander-
son, de Palma, and Thisse, 1992) described in
Equation (3) above. Specifically, we assume
consumer preferences are given by a random
utility model with consumer heterogeneity de-
scribedbyanextremevaluedistributionfunction,
from which we derive an estimable demand
system for domestic and imported potatoes as
well as all potato substitutes. To derive an esti-
mable version of Equation (3), we follow Berry
(1994) and linearize the aggregate share function
sothatthemarketshareofeachproductiswritten:
(10)





and the unobservable error term, xj, becomes
the econometric error term. In a discrete choice
demand model, each of the gj parameters are
product-specific preference parameters. Al-
though it would be preferable to have detailed
product attribute, marketing mix, and other
variables to include in the vector xj, in this
application, we know very little detail about the
products that are consumed so the vector of
attributes consists of monthly and yearly binary
variables. Including monthly binary variables is
important because Mexican consumers rely
primarily on domestic production for supply
(and imports from the United States), so the
potato market is subject to seasonal fluctua-
tions both in availability and quality. The out-
side option is intended to reflect all other
consumption possibilities available to Mexican
consumers that may substitute for domestic
potatoes, imported potatoes, or the rest of the
products considered ‘‘inside’’ (Berry, Levinsohn,
and Pakes, 1995). Therefore, we define the out-
side option as the per-capita volume of all food
not committed to the starchy staples considered
here as measured by a standard, nation-wide
food consumption survey (Barquera et al., 2006).
All quantities are measured in kg per capita, and
prices in pesos per kg and represent national
average values. Because the linearized logit
model has a closed form solution, we estimate
using standard instrumental variable techniques,
specifically two-stage least squares (2SLS) and
generalized method of moments (GMM).
The ability to use an instrumental variable
estimator is important, because consumer prices
are likely to be endogenous. In the demand
model, valid instruments must be correlated
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the residual in the demand equation. Input
prices, prices of related products, and truly
exogenous demand factors (demographics, so-
cioeconomic indicators) are typical candidates.
In the current example, given the relative lack
of data from official Mexican sources, we use
all exogenous variables, lagged values of en-
dogenous variables, producer prices (a proxy
for input costs), and a residual measure of
technical progress. The resulting demand
elasticity will be an unbiased estimate of the
true market demand response.
On the supply side, we estimate Equation
(6) using the same approach (GMM). In this
case, however, the set of instruments includes
all exogenous and predetermined variables that
are likely to shift demand and thus identify the
supply curve for each product. Per capita in-
come, alternative product prices, aggregate
population, seasonal and annual binary varia-
bles, and exchange rates are all effective in this
regard. In monthly data, we model shipments
out of inventory and not annual planting deci-
sions. Output supply is a function of the ex-
pected output price, alternative product prices,
expected input prices, seasonal variation, and
the state of technology. The output price is the
expected Mexican producer price, whereas al-
ternative crops include rice, corn, and beans.
We choose a GL functional form because it is
inherently linear homogeneous, flexible and
has been shown to perform well in general
specification tests against alternative models of
supply (Shumway and Lim, 1993). Symmetry
and convexity are imposed globally during the
estimation procedure.
Data Description
Potato production is defined as the total value
of alpha potatoes, hybrid potatoes, and unclas-
sified potatoes expressed in constant 2008 peso
terms. Productionvalue is converted into quantity
(kg) values by dividing by the average grower
price, which is defined as the average real price
paid for potatoes grown in Mexico as reported
by Sistema di Informacion Agroalimentaria de
Consulta (SIACON) on a monthly basis. Potato
imports from the United States are from
FASOnline (United States Department of Ag-
riculture, Foreign Agricultural Services, 2008)
and are expressed in constant (June 2008)
pesos, converted from U.S. dollars by multi-
plying by a real exchange rate. The real ex-
change rate is defined as the nominal, or ob-
served exchange rate, multiplied by the ratio of
the U.S. consumer price index (CPI) to the
Mexican CPI. Both the exchange rate and CPI
are from Bancomex. Under purchasing power
parity, the real exchange rate is a constant so
adjusting the nominal exchange rate in this way
corrects for deviations in real purchasing power
between the two countries. Import prices are
unit value indices calculated by dividing the
real monthly value of potato imports reported
by FAS by the monthly quantities. Implicitly,
therefore, these unit value indices assume that
potatoes of constant quality are imported
throughout the marketing year. Potato con-
sumption is defined as apparent disappearance
as it is calculated as a residual of production
plus imports less exports. To maintain compa-
rabilitybetween U.S.and domestic potatoes,all
prices are measured at the wholesale level. We
have no reason to believe that retail-wholesale
margins should differ between the two types of
potatoes in a systematic way, so using whole-
sale prices should not bias our demand esti-
mates. All of thevariables used in this study are
summarized in Table 2 below.
Results and Discussion
This section presents the results obtained from
estimating each of the econometric models and
then simulation results from the trade- and
welfare-effect models. In each case, we discuss
the implications of our results for potential
changes in trade policy.
We first examine whether or not domestic
Mexican prices are indeed endogenous. Forthis
purpose, we present three different sets of es-
timates, and conduct a specification test of the
estimator that does not account for endogeneity
(ordinary least squares). The three sets of esti-
mates in Table 3 correspond to one estimator
that is known to be inconsistent when prices
are endogenous, and two that are consistent.
A third, generalized method of moments is
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 2009 768preferred under endogeneity because it pro-
duces estimates that are correct under a number
of other known sources of inconsistency. We
use a Hausman (1978) specification test to
determine which set of estimates is preferred.
According to the Hausman (1978) test, the es-
timator that is efficient and consistent under the
assumption of no endogeneity, but inconsistent
if prices are endogenous, is compared with
one that is inefficient under the maintained
hypothesis, but is consistent under the alterna-
tive hypothesis that prices are endogenous. For
this purpose, we use the GMM estimator. The
resulting test statistic is chi-square distributed
withdegreesoffreedomequaltok21,wherekis
thenumberofexplanatoryvariablesinthemodel.
Because the critical chi-square value for 5 de-
grees offreedom at a 5.0% level is 26.296 while
the test statistic value is 83.590, we easily reject
the null hypothesis of no endogeneity and con-
clude that the GMM estimator is consistent, but
theordinaryleastsquares(OLS)estimatorisnot.
Focusing on the GMM model estimates, the
results in Table 3 show each of the parameters
of interest. First, a J-test of the overidentifying
restrictions associated with the GMM estimator
fails to reject the null hypothesis that the set of
instruments are all truly exogenous (test value
of 2.401 is less than the critical value c
2
16 5
15.339). Therefore, the GMM estimator is
likelyvalid. Second,thelogit scale parameter is
0.615. Because this parameter indicates the
degree of substitutability among the set of
products under consideration, and is greater
than zero, the two types of potatoes and potato
substitutes are clearly not regarded as perfect
substitutes. Furthermore, because this value is
significantly different from 1.0, they are not
regarded as completely distinct products either.
Finding a scale parameter that lies clearly be-
tween 0 and 1.0 provides some evidence that a
differentiated-product approach is appropriate.
Third, the own-price elasticity of demand is
20.599. This elasticity estimate means that
consumers reduce potato purchases by ap-
proximately 0.60% for every 1.0% increase in
prices. This is similar to other empirical studies
(20.48, Tecnologico de Monterrey, 2007), and
not unreasonable given the staple nature of
potatoes and the small quantity of potatoes
consumed by the average consumer (and high
prices). Fourth, the cross-price elasticity of
demand is 0.011which is characteristically low
for a logit model. Note, however, that the sim-
ple logit used here is subject to the independence
of irrelevant alternatives property, which means
that the cross-price elasticity is the same for all
pairs of substitute products. Although often
considered a weakness of the simple logit, it is of
little consequence here because we are primarily
interested in accurately estimating the own-price
elasticity and not in the complete matrix of
cross-price elasticities. Furthermore, the product-
specific preference parameters suggest that, at
Table 2. Summary of Data Used in Demand and Supply Models
Variable Units N Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
Production 000 M tons 54 189.91 173.34 0.00 678.40
Imports 000 M tons 54 10.05 2.20 5.70 15.40
Exports 000 M tons 54 0.42 1.35 0.00 10.18
Price (pesos) pesos/kg 54 7.35 1.39 5.40 11.50
Mexico price (dollars) $/kg 54 0.30 0.06 0.22 0.48
Import price $/kg 54 0.40 0.07 0.28 0.64
Population millions 54 104.78 1.32 103.00 107.00
Exchange rate pesos/$ 54 10.96 0.28 10.33 11.52
Rice price pesos/kg 54 6.25 1.42 5.00 11.90
Corn price pesos/kg 54 2.79 0.53 2.20 3.87
Bean price pesos/kg 54 10.56 1.88 7.00 16.25
Rice output 000 M tons 54 83.02 133.45 0.00 538.96
Corn output 000 M tons 54 8,973.80 10,441.00 0.00 40,379.00
Bean output 000 M tons 54 720.00 655.80 0.00 2,861.10
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mestic potatoes over imported and tend to
prefer rice and beans to corn or the outside
option. Potato demand also exhibits significant
seasonality, with large swings in potato market
share between the summer and winter months.
Finding the elasticity of demand in this way,
however, provides only part of the information
necessary to calculate the value of the tariff
barrier (TB), t, as it also depends upon the
elasticity of domestic supply as well.
On the supply side, the Hausman (1978)
specification test yields similar results to the
demand case. Namely, we strongly reject the
notion that prices are exogenous as the Haus-
man test statistic value of 826.216 is greater
than the critical value of 54.572. Therefore, we
again use a GMM estimator for the supply
model. The GL supply function provides a good
fit to the data, as evidenced by the high coeffi-
cient of determination and the relatively large
number of significant explanatory variables.
Because the GL supply model is highly nonlin-
ear, the structural coefficients provide little di-
rect information as to the sensitivity of Mexican
growers to price. Therefore, we calculate the
supply elasticity using the specification given in
Equation (7) above. Evaluated at the means of
all explanatory variables, the elasticity of supply
is 0.409, which is reasonable and consistent
with other empirical studies (Tecnologico de
Monterrey, 2007). As expected, supply also ex-
hibits significant seasonal variation as potato
growing occurs throughout the country with
production seasons often overlapping between
several regions at any given time (Table 4).
Table 3. Discrete Choice Demand Estimates: Potatoes, Corn, Beans, and Rice, Mexico
OLS 2SLS GMM
Estimate t-Ratio Estimate t-Ratio Estimate t-Ratio
Domestica 21.352* 22.713 3.792 1.872 3.255* 2.061
Imported 25.486* 211.980 24.714* 25.228 24.773* 25.883
Corn 20.014 20.254 20.390* 22.400 20.299* 22.052
Beans 0.112 0.842 0.604* 2.030 0.504 1.959
Rice 0.071 1.831 0.679* 3.042 0.609* 3.099
Price 22.879* 22.207 237.610* 23.065 234.286* 23.406
Jan 22.226* 28.320 21.900* 23.773 21.984* 24.343
Feb 21.659* 26.468 21.133* 22.246 21.228* 23.324
Mar 21.164* 24.531 20.912 21.903 21.025* 22.650
April 21.498* 25.817 21.412* 22.978 21.562* 24.314
May 21.497* 25.787 21.330* 22.778 21.445* 23.501
June 21.989* 27.690 22.024* 24.258 22.034* 25.378
July 22.427* 29.035 22.763* 25.446 22.831* 26.407
Aug 21.556* 25.780 22.011* 23.874 22.030* 24.585
Sept 21.410* 25.246 21.687* 23.356 21.741* 23.401
Oct 20.396 21.468 21.016 21.882 20.946 21.495
Nov 20.063 20.234 20.641 21.204 20.578 21.318
R
2 0.836 0.891 0.914
D.W. 1.335 1.634 1.679




Notes: OLS is ordinary least squares; 2SLS is two-stage least squares; GMM is generalized method of moments.
a D.W. is the Durbin-Watson statistic used to test for first-order autocorrelation. Hausman is the value of a chi-square distributed
test statistic that is used to test whether consumer prices are endogenous to the economic problem described here. Critical value
of the Hausman statistic, which is chi-square distributed with k 2 1 degrees of freedom, is 26.296.
* Indicates significance at a 5.0% level.
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above are used to estimate the trade and welfare
impacts of removing all import restrictions on
U.S. potatoes. For this analysis, we assume
Mexico is a relatively small importer compared
with the scale of the U.S. market.5 We also as-
sume that the initial price and quantity are from
the most recent marketing year, 2008. After
presenting the initial results, we relax this as-
sumption to introduce potential price effects in
addition to the pure trade and welfare results.
All trade and welfare effects depend on the
price gap between Mexican consumer prices and
import prices, or t in the economic model de-
scribed above. Using the average prices reported
for 2008 as a benchmark, we find that consumer
prices are 15.1% higher than import prices.
Once the market is opened, trade will flow to
reestablish an equilibrium between these two
prices—controlling for the difference in prefer-
ences for Mexican and U.S. potatoes. Table 5
shows the potential annual trade impacts that
result under three elasticity assumptions. Given
that the elasticity estimates presented above are
just that—estimates—the true values are un-
known so we present welfare results using a
range of elasticities that encompasses a range of
plausiblevalues on the demand and supply sides
(eD 52 0.25 to 21.00 and eS 5 0.25–1.00).
Under the baseline elasticity assumption (eD 5
20.599, eS 5 0.409) we find that the quantity
demanded on the Mexican market would rise
from 2.39 million tons per year to 3.62 million
tons per year and the quantity supplied would
fall from 2.32 million tons to 1.76 million tons
per year so imports would rise by 1.78 million
tons per year. At 2008 prices, this represents an
additional 3.4 billion pesos ($317.7 million) in
incremental trade value. Clearly, this is a very
significant increase in trade given that total U.S.
production in 2005 was approximately 20.7
million tons. Although we are confident in the
accuracy of our supply and demand estimates, if
the elasticity of demand were 21.0 and the
elasticity of supply 1.0, then the rise in trade
wouldbemuchgreater:3.2milliontonsperyear,




the rise in trade becomes 0.80 million tons per
year, which is still roughly 10 times the volume
of current U.S./Mexican potato trade. Increased
trade,however,willbenefitawidergroupofstake-
holders than U.S. potato exporters.
Because greater trade flows, by definition,
imply lower prices for Mexican consumers,
consumer surplus will rise upon removing the
trade restrictions. Of course, much of this gain
will come from Mexican potato producers. We
quantify this result by calculating the changes
in consumers’ surplus (CS) and producers’
surplus (PS) that result from opening potato
trade with Mexico. Table 5 shows the changes
in CS and PS under the three elasticity sce-
narios described above. In the baseline, or es-
timated case, CS rises by over 4.0 billion pesos
per year ($380.0 million U.S. Dollars [USD]).
Mexican growers, on the other hand, stand to
lose over 2.8 billion pesos per year ($266.1
million USD). If Mexican policymakers weigh
consumers’ and producers’ interests equally,
the net gain of 1.2 billion pesos per year sug-
gests that removing the remaining barriers to
potato tradewould be in the best interests of the
Mexican economy as a whole. Under the high
elasticity scenario, the rise in CS is almost 4.6
billion pesos per year ($432.1 million USD)
and the lost PS is 2.4 billion pesos ($227.0
million USD) so the gains are even more sub-
stantial. With the more conservative elasticity
assumption from the consumer perspective, the
gain in CS falls to 3.6 billion pesos ($334.9
million USD), but the loss in PS rises to 3.0
billion pesos ($283.9 million USD). Clearly,
the less elastic is demand, the smaller the gain
in CS, but the less elastic is supply, the larger
the loss in PS. Under all scenarios, however, the
net gain to the Mexican economy is significant.
5In 2005, Mexican imports were 54,594 tons
(Secretarı ´a de Agricultura, Ganaderı ´a, Desarrollo Ru-
ral, Pesca y Alimentacio ´n, Servicio de Informacio ´ny
Estadı ´stica Agroalimentaria Pesquera, 2006) while
U.S. production was 20.7 million tons. Mexican im-
ports were, therefore, only 0.2% of U.S. production so
not likely to have a significant price impact. Further,
the U.S. industry is highly competitive, so any increase
in demand would be met by an equal increase in
production in the long run, maintaining prices at
average cost in the long run.
Richards, Molina, and Hussein: Mexico Potato Quarantine 771The fact that the trade restrictions persist even
though these benefits are potentially achievable
suggests that the Mexican industry may have a
strong political influence over agricultural
policymakers in Mexico.
Many researchers in this area (Calvin and
Krissoff, 1998; Josling, 1997; Roberts and
Orden, 1997) regard the potential demand or
supply shifts in the host country that may
accompany a relaxation of SPS trade regula-
tions as a key source of either welfare gains or
losses. In the Mexican potato case, if a shift
were to occur, it would be on the supply side,
because the quarantine was put in place to
protect against agricultural pests that would
reduce yields and raise production costs, but
not alter eating quality or the inherent safety of
either domestic or imported potatoes. Although
Table 4. Supply Model Estimates: Potatoes, Corn, Rice and Beans
OLS 2SLS GMM
Estimate t-Ratio Estimate t-Ratio Estimate t-Ratio
g10 0.905* 2.473 20.216 21.555 20.311* 22.431
g11 2.405* 3.180 0.032 0.116 0.648* 3.248
g12 0.116 0.555 0.054 0.589 0.072 0.843
g13 22.430* 23.019 0.23 0.838 0.618* 3.218
g14 20.352 21.608 0.043 0.592 0.273* 2.478
t11 20.970* 23.104 20.007 20.062 0.090 0.919
t12 20.932 22.951 0.036 0.322 0.141* 2.441
t13 20.631* 22.700 20.024 20.286 0.056 0.822
t14 20.183 21.116 20.044 20.776 0.001 0.035
g20 20.003 20.022 0.109 1.876 0.141* 3.220
g21 24.934* 23.565 1.174 1.383 0.461* 2.785
g22 4.618* 3.946 0.976 1.341 1.245 1.810
g23 0.578* 2.022 0.299* 2.202 0.088* 2.281
t21 0.377* 3.472 0.110 1.656 0.008 0.289
t22 0.328* 2.761 0.019 0.267 20.082* 23.001
t23 0.270* 3.138 0.076 1.545 0.013 0.47
t24 0.076 1.312 0.039 1.254 0.006 0.244
g30 41.559* 2.682 16.610 1.162 20.71 20.145
g31 261.666 21.508 20.819 0.571 5.818* 7.186
g32 4.332 0.665 11.049* 2.420 0.921* 2.405
t31 9.462 1.825 4.685 0.993 21.822 20.874
t32 4.456 0.827 22.559 20.516 28.905* 24.239
t33 8.170* 2.218 3.385 0.972 20.558 20.296
t34 5.576* 2.514 5.460* 2.488 3.507* 1.979
g40 0.781 1.251 1.513* 5.353 1.120* 5.298
g41 22.91 20.398 11.960* 2.519 12.835* 2.734
t41 0.169 0.340 0.739* 2.280 20.02 20.161
t42 20.147 20.310 0.325 1.001 20.399* 23.341
t43 0.432 1.292 0.713* 3.038 0.247* 2.054
t34 0.047 0.219 0.206 1.420 0.026 0.211
R
2 0.781 0.678 0.926




a In this table, a single asterisk indicates significance at a 5.0% level. Symmetry and convexity are imposed in estimation. G is
the GMM objective functionvalue and Es is the elasticity of supply at sample means. The critical value of the Hausman statistic
is 54.572. Monthly binary variables suppressed to conserve space.
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imports from all 50 states in 2003, and prom-
ised to relax the 26 km zone restriction within 2
years, this latter change has yet to take place.
Furthermore, because our data begins in January
of 2004, it is not possible to test for any supply
or demand changes that may have resulted from
even this threat of opening the border further.
Nevertheless, it is instructive to compare the
baseline scenario considered in Table 5 with one
that envisions either a positive or negative sup-
ply response to the removal of all trade barriers.
Either is possible, depending on the nature and
validity of the SPS trade bans (Josling, 1997).
We recalculate the change in trade and
welfare under an assumption that Mexican
potato supply shifts backward (falls) at each
price by 10% and under an alternative as-
sumption that Mexican supply rises by 10%.
The change in trade and welfare that result are
foundinTable 6.Because Mexican potatoesare
significantly differentiated from U.S. imports,
both consumers and producers of Mexican
potatoes will be impacted by any change in
supply of domestically produced potatoes.
Producers face higher or lower costs depending
on the nature of the shift. In the case of a
backward shift in supply, costs may rise due to
increased monitoring efforts, spraying, fumi-
gating, or other processes required to ensure the
imported disease does not destroy their crop or
their ability to grow. With a negative supply
shock of 10%, PS falls by approximately 2.6
billion pesos ($246.9 million USD), or 266.4
million pesos less than the no-shock scenario
with the opening of trade under base elasticity
assumptions. The loss in producer surplus is
smaller under the negative supply-shock scenario
because producer prices rise as a result, and the
net benefit to opening trade is still positive.
On the other hand, supply may instead shift
outward due to induced efficiencies on the part
of Mexican growers as they try to reduce costs
to compete with U.S. imports. Assuming the
magnitude of this improvement is again 10%,
theresults in Table 6 showthat thechange inPS
due to the border opening is approximately 2.9
billion pesos ($269.1 million USD), or 30.3
million pesos less than under the no-shock
scenario. Although prices fall as a result of the
shock to supply, the added production partially
outweighs the price effect. Policymakers
should add this potential benefit to the gain in
CS above when comparing the costs and ben-
efits of further relaxing the border restrictions.
More scientific research into the basis of
either side’s claims would add another dimen-
sion to this welfare analysis. Orden and Ro-
mano (1996) recognize that the potential shift
in supply described here is not a ‘‘determinis-
tic’’ or certain event. Rather, the evaluation
should be conducted as a risk assessment ex-
ercise, with probabilities attached to each out-
come. In the avocado case considered by Orden
and Romano (1996), the science that had been
conducted into potential infestation of Mexican










DCS million 2008 pesos 4,033.59 3,554.91 4,586.25
DPS million 2008 pesos 22,886.22 23,013.28 22,410.17
DT ,000 tons 1,783.35 797.72 3,204.89
qd
0 ,000 tons 2,393.37 2,393.37 2,393.37
qs
0 ,000 tons 2,319.69 2,319.69 2,319.69
qd
1 ,000 tons 3,615.58 2,902.51 4,438.87
qs
1 ,000 tons 1,759.09 2,031.11 1,160.32
a DCS is the change in consumer surplus relative to the initial, trade-restricted case, in millions of 2008 pesos. DPS is the change
in producer surplus in millions of 2008 pesos. DT is the change in trade (imports less exports), in thousands of metric tons. qd
0
and qs
0 are the initial demand and supply of potatoes in Mexico, in thousands of metric tons, respectively and qd
1 and qs
1 are their
values after easing the trade restrictions. Note that all values are annual averages.
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tistical analysis was indeed possible. In the U.S.
potato case, however, there is little evidence
upon which to base an empirical assessment of
the likelihood of any infestation in the U.S. be-
ing carried into Mexico. In fact, given that An-
imal and PlantHealth Protection Service andthe
U.S. industry maintain that any pathogen borne
by U.S. potatoes already exists in Mexico, the
point is mute. If future research should advance
in this direction, however, a risk assessment of
potential shifts in Mexican supply due to inva-
sive species would be warranted.
Conclusions and Implications
In this study, we examine the welfare effects on
the Mexican economy of SPS trade restrictions
on U.S. potato imports. Specifically, we con-
duct a trade-volume and welfare analysis of
relaxing SPS regulations on the import of fresh
U.S. potatoes into Mexico beyond the current
26 km exclusion zone. To calculate the likely
trade and welfare effects of letting more U.S.
potatoes into the larger Mexican urban markets,
we estimate econometric models of Mexican
potato supply and demand that explicitly rec-
ognize the differentiated nature of U.S. and
Mexican potatoes. These models provide esti-
matesoftheelasticitiesofsupply anddemand—
parameters that determine how equilibrium
trade flows will change if U.S. and Mexican
prices are allowed to readjust to a new equi-
librium. Consistent with recent literature in the
trade analysis field, we use a ‘‘price-wedge’’
modeling framework in which a ‘‘tariff equiv-
alent’’ value of existing trade restrictions is
used to impute a likely change in potato prices
in Mexico should trade barriers be reduced.
This price change is then used to calculate the
likely change in Mexican demand, supply,
trade, and welfare.
Our results show that Mexican and U.S.
potatoes are indeed differentiated products, and
that both supply and demand are inelastic. In-
elastic demand and supply mean that the price
change that is likely to result from opening the
Mexican market to trade will cause a relatively
small change in both quantity demanded and
supplied within Mexico, but given the volume
of Mexican potato consumption, the change in
trade is significant. Mexican prices are ex-
pected to fall by approximately 15% once trade
is allowed beyond the exclusion zone. As a re-
sult, reestablishing equilibrium between Mex-
ican and world prices would cause trade to rise
by nearly 1.8 million metric tons, which would
lead to a rise in Mexican consumer surplus of
some 4.0 billion pesos per year at a cost of 2.9
billion pesos in grower profit. Even under more
conservative assumptions of the elasticities of
supply and demand, consumers would benefit
by nearly 3.5 billion pesos per year while
producers lose 3.0 billion. Clearly, maintaining
the 26 km exclusionary zone benefits Mexican
potato growers at the expense of Mexican con-
sumers, and potato producers in the rest of the
world.
Although we are confident in our results, the
modeling approach used in this study requires a
number of assumptions. First, we assume that
the Mexican data are accurate and has been
appropriately adjusted for inflation and cur-
rency exchange. Second, although we allow for
Table 6. Welfare Effects of Opening U.S./Mexico Trade, with Mexican Supply Shock
Supply Shock Assumption
No Shock
a DS 52 10% DS 51 10%
DCS million 2008 pesos 4,033.59 3,951.85 4,116.03
DPS million 2008 pesos 22,886.22 22,619.84 22,855.99
DT ,000 tons 1,783.35 1,836.99 1,729.72
qd
0 ,000 tons 2,393.37 2,393.37 2,393.37
qs
0 ,000 tons 2,319.69 2,319.69 2,319.69
qd
1 ,000 tons 3,615.58 3,493.85 3,738.41
qs
1 ,000 tons 1,759.09 1,583.81 1,935.01
a Elasticity values used to generate results in this table are from the estimates reported above. All values are annual averages.
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differentiated products by consumers, unlike
the conventional price-wedge approach, our
analysis still simplifies the market somewhat in
ways that may or may not be realistic. For ex-
ample, different regions within Mexico have
distinctly different preferences for potatoes,
corn, and other staple products, but our data
would not support a regional analysis within
Mexico. Furthermore, because there is no data
describing truly free trade between the U.S. and
Mexico, there is no way to know with certainty
whether or not there will be a price impact in
the United States. Third, as with any other
study based on econometric estimation, we
assume that our statistical models are appro-
priate and that the specification tests used are
sufficient to rule out other, potentially better,
modeling approaches. Fourth, we assume that
the economic effects of allowing free trade in
potatoes between the U.S. and Mexico will not
elicit a strategic response from Mexican trade
authorities in other commodity markets, or in
other areas of potato and potato product trade.
[Received December 2007; Accepted January 2009.]
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